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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 Defendant bank accepted drafts drawn on plaintiff 
containing the direction "PAY AND DEPOSIT ONLY TO THE CREDIT OF 
[payee]" and on which the payee's indorsements were forged. 
Reasoning that the drafts were in effect negotiable, the district 
court in this diversity case entered judgment for the bank, based 
on Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in 
Pennsylvania.  We conclude that the explicit direction on the 
drafts precluded transfer and made them non-negotiable. Moreover, 
we hold that the indorsements in blank did not make the drafts 
bearer paper.  Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment in favor 
of the bank and remand the matter for resolution of the 
plaintiff's claims under the bank collection provisions of the 
Uniform Commercial Code and the common law.   
 Universal Premium Acceptance Corporation, having its 
principal office in St. Louis, Missouri, provides financing to 
policyholders to pay their insurance premiums.  In the fall of 
1991, Walter Talbot of the W. Talbot Insurance Agency in 
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Lancaster, Pennsylvania, requested Universal to provide financing 
for his customers who needed funds to pay premiums on policies 
issued by the Great American Insurance Company.   
 Universal accepted Talbot's proposal and sent him the 
necessary documents, including blank drafts.  The face of each 
instrument contained Universal's name and address in the top left 
corner, and a large UPAC logo in the top center.  Below UPAC's 
address was printed "PAY AND DEPOSIT ONLY TO THE CREDIT OF: 
__________  INSURANCE CO." with a space for the amount.  On the 
lower right side of the instrument were blanks for the 
policyholder's name, the insurance agency name, and a line for 
"SIGNATURE OF PRODUCER OF RECORD/BROKER/AGENT."   In the lower 
right corner beneath the signature line appear the name and 
address of the Landmark Bank.   
 The back of each instrument contained pre-printed 
language:  "Acceptance of this draft acknowledges Universal 
Premium Acceptance Corporation's interest in the unearned or 
return premium(s) and that we have issued a policy(ies) to the 
named applicant (insured) in the amount of the premium 
indicated." 
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 Between September 1991 and July 1992, Talbot signed 
drafts for more than $1 million in favor of Great American, but 
did not deliver them to the insurance company.  Instead, he    
arranged for his confederates to forge the indorsement of Great 
American and deposit the drafts in an account they opened at 
defendant York Bank under the name of "Small Businessman's 
Service Corporation."  York deposited the drafts without securing 
the indorsement of Small Businessman's Service Corporation and 
transmitted them to Landmark (later renamed Magna Bank of 
Missouri), Universal's bank in St. Louis. 
 As part of the scheme, Talbot and his associates set up 
a dummy "Great American Insurance Company" office in Lancaster 
and furnished its address and telephone number to Universal.  To 
verify that Great American had issued a policy, Universal would 
contact that office.  After assurance from Talbot's cohorts there 
that the transaction was in order, Universal would then authorize 
Landmark to pay the draft.   
 After the fraud was discovered, Talbot was convicted 
and imprisoned.  Universal recovered part of its loss from Talbot 
and then filed suit in its own behalf and as assignee of Landmark 
against York.  The complaints asserted claims under Articles 3 
and 4 of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacted in Pennsylvania 
at 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 3101-4504, as well as for 
negligence and conversion.  
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 The district court granted summary judgment for York. 
Essentially adopting the theories the bank had advanced, the 
court decided that: 
 1. The drafts were to be treated as if they were 
negotiable.  Although they did not contain the 
terms "to the order of" or "to bearer," they could 
be viewed as negotiable under 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 3805.   
 
 2. Talbot signed the drafts on behalf of Universal. 
 
 3. Because Talbot did not intend Great American to 
have any interest in the drafts, 13 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 3405(a), the fictitious payee 
provision, applied and shielded York from what 
otherwise would have been its liability for paying 
on a forged indorsement.   
 
 4. The forged indorsement of Great American was in 
blank and thereby made the drafts payable to 
bearer.   
 
 5. Because the drafts had become bearer paper, York 
did not act in bad faith in depositing them in the 
Small Businessman's Service Corporation account.   
 
 
Accordingly, the district court found that York was not liable 
under either the Uniform Commercial Code or common law. 
 Universal has appealed, contending that the limiting 
language as to the payee on the drafts did not permit York to 
deposit them in the Small Businessman's account, that the 
fictitious payee provision does not apply, and that the 
negligence claim should not have been resolved in York's favor.  
I. 
 One of the requirements for negotiability under 13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3104(a)(3) is that an instrument must be 
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"payable to order or to bearer."1  How the parties regard or 
characterize the instrument is immaterial.  "The negotiability of 
an instrument cannot be established by waiver. . . . [W]here the 
statute requires certain elements, it is not for private persons 
to dispense with or waive them."  5A Ronald A. Anderson, Uniform 
Commercial Code § 3-104:13 (3d ed. 1994).  See also Anderson  
§ 3-112:1 (official code comment).  The drafts here did not meet 
the terms of § 3104.     
 In some circumstances instruments that are not payable 
"to order" or "to bearer" may nevertheless be within the scope of 
Article 3 of the Code except that there can be no holder in due 
course of such an item.  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3805 provides 
that Article 3 "applies to any instrument whose terms do not 
preclude transfer and which is otherwise negotiable within this 
division but which is not payable to order or to bearer  
. . . ."    
 The commentary to section 3805 cites as a typical 
example an item that reads "Pay John Doe" without the words "to 
the order of."  See, e.g., Key Bank of Southeastern New York, 
N.A. v. Strober Bros., Inc., 523 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988).  Such instruments have been termed "technically non-
negotiable" because they meet all requirements as to form except 
                     
1Because the incidents in this case took place before the 
effective date of the revised edition of the Uniform Commercial 
Code presently in effect in Pennsylvania, the older version, 
rather than the current one, is applicable here.  See Menichini 
v. Grant, 995 F.2d 1224, 1229 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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they are not payable to order or bearer.2  See Henry J. Bailey & 
Richard B. Hagedorn, Brady on Bank Checks ¶ 2.17 (7th ed. 1992). 
 The language on the drafts, "PAY AND DEPOSIT ONLY TO 
THE CREDIT OF:  Great American Insurance Company," goes beyond a 
mere technicality.  Not only did these drafts lack "to the order 
of," they contained specific instructions -- "deposit only to the 
credit of."  Implicit in such language is a warning of non-
negotiability.  See C.R. v. The Travelers, 626 A.2d 588 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1993) (presuming that proper restriction on face of 
draft would have prevented negotiation).      
 The drafts demonstrate that they were not meant to be 
freely transferable, but were to be "deposited" and "only" to the 
credit of the insurance company.  "Deposited" implies that the 
instruments were to have a limited use and a short transactional 
life.  "Only" can be understood to modify "deposited" or the 
payee, but in either instance, the language is quite restrictive. 
The terms on the face of the items were meant to preclude 
transfer.  See Resorts Int'l Hotel, Inc. v. Salomone, 429 A.2d 
1078 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (counter checks); Central 
Bank v. Kaipern Santa Clara Fed. Credit Union, 191 Cal. App. 3d 
186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (money orders).  We hold, therefore, 
                     
2Section 3805 was deleted from the 1990 revision of the Code and 
a check payable "To John Doe" without the word "order" is now 
treated as a negotiable instrument and the holder in due course 
provisions do apply.  See 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3104 & cmt. 2 
(Supp. 1995) (effective July 9, 1993).  The revision to the Code 
intends that these instruments, which look like and are intended 
to be checks, should be treated as such.  We note that the drafts 
here are not checks and that the broad language of section 3805 
has been deleted in the 1990 revision.   
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that the drafts were not "otherwise negotiable" within the scope 
of section 3805. 
II. 
 As an alternative method of finding negotiability, York 
argues that even if not originally negotiable, the indorsements 
in blank by "Great American" converted the drafts into "bearer," 
negotiable, instruments.  We reject that premise.   
 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3204(b) provides that a blank 
indorsement on a negotiable instrument transforms it into a 
bearer instrument, but that section has no application to a non-
negotiable item.  An item which is non-negotiable in its 
inception remains so.  Mere indorsement of such a draft does not 
change its character.  As one court remarked, to sanction any 
other result would enable an indorser to change the rights and 
liabilities of the prior parties in a most material fashion. 
Wettlaufer v. Baxter, 125 S.W. 741 (Ky. 1910).  See also Foley v. 
Hardy, 253 Pac. 238 (Kan. 1927).    
 These cases are pre-U.C.C., but have retained their 
authoritative status.  See Partney v. Reed, 889 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1994) (negotiability determined from four corners of 
instrument at time it was issued without reference to extrinsic 
facts).   
  
 One commentator has remarked:   
"In order to understand the UCC definitions 
in the area of negotiable instruments, you 
must first know the law of negotiable 
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instruments.  In other words, the Code is not 
a code that tells a student or a banker or a 
lawyer what the law is.  It is rather a 
compilation of notes that may serve to remind 
you of law you had better know before you 
read the UCC."   
David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 
Yale L. J. 185, 192-93 (1967).  For views on negotiability as 
expressed in later treatises, see Anderson § 3-202:56 at 503 ("An 
indorsement has no effect upon negotiability, without regard to 
the nature or terminology of the indorsement"); Brady on Bank 
Checks § 2.1 ("Negotiability must be determined solely by what is 
written on the face of the instrument").   
 We conclude, therefore, that the drafts did not become 
bearer or negotiable instruments by virtue of the forged blank 
indorsements of the Great American Insurance Company.   
III. 
 The general rule is a bank that pays on a forged 
indorsement is liable to the drawer.  However, 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 3405(a) (the fictitious payee exception) provides that an 
indorsement by any person in the name of the designated payee is 
effective if the drawer intends the payee to have no interest in 
the instrument.  That provision is intended to protect banks that 
cash instruments with such forged indorsements and is based on 
the assumption that as between the bank and the drawer, the 
latter is in a better position to prevent the loss. 
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   We have held that section 3405 should be interpreted 
broadly enough to carry out its purpose.  New Amsterdam Casualty 
Co. v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 451 F.2d 892 (3d 
Cir. 1971).  But, in McAdam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 896 
F.2d 750, 762 (3d Cir. 1990), we recognized that because this 
provision "is a banker's exception which dramatically departs 
from the general UCC rule and narrows the liability of a bank, 
courts should be cautious in expanding the section's scope beyond 
its explicit rationale."  Commentators have also characterized 
section 3405 as a banker's provision that should be strictly 
construed so as not to give more protection than is stated.  See 
James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code § 16-
8 (2d ed. 1980).   
  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3405 is not applicable here 
because it speaks only to negotiable instruments.  Although 
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code is sometimes applied by 
analogy to non-negotiable instruments, in that situation as well, 
the same cautious approach to section 3405 should be used.     
 The scenario here is quite different from a scheme in 
which a faithless employee obtains a company check payable to a 
non-existent person and then cashes it.  In such situations there 
is some merit in relieving the bank from liability and leaving 
the employer to bear the loss.  However, the direction on the 
drafts here to "pay and deposit only to the credit of Great 
American" was explicit.   
 The action of York Bank in permitting the deposit of 
the drafts in the Small Businessman's Service Corporation account 
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instead of Great American's account created quite a different 
situation than cashing the check of a fictitious payee.  The face 
of the drafts raised a red flag and was enough to put York on 
notice that something was amiss in the Talbot group's dealings 
with it.  We are not persuaded that the fictitious payee 
exception should be carried over to the non-negotiable 
instruments in this case. 
IV. 
 Our conclusions that the drafts are non-negotiable and 
that the fictitious payee exemption is not applicable undermine 
the basic premises upon which the district court based its 
decision.  Consequently, the case must be remanded to the 
district court for further proceedings during which the parties 
may develop their contentions consistent with appropriate legal 
principles.  We expect that on remand some of the confusion that 
developed because of the alternative and, at some points, 
inconsistent theories advanced by the parties may be dispelled. 
The district court is entitled to a more focused presentation of 
the issues than that which occurred.   
 Our holding that these drafts were not negotiable means 
that some of the parties' arguments to this Court and the 
district court have become irrelevant.  We need not discuss them 
further, but in the interests of simplification, we will dispose 
of several issues summarily so that they need not be considered 
on remand:   
 (1)  The mere fact that Universal entrusted Talbot with 
the forms is not a proper basis for imputation of agency between 
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him and Universal.  The premium financing agreement specifically 
disclaims such a relationship and there is no evidence of 
apparent authority in this record.   
 (2) Universal is incorrect in characterizing the 
direction "pay and deposit only" on the face of the drafts as an 
"indorsement."   
 (3)  The parties' discussion about ratification of the 
forged indorsements is not pertinent at this point.  Pennsylvania 
does not permit ratification of a forgery on a non-negotiable 
item.  See Funds for Business Growth, Inc. v. Woodland Marble & 
Tile Co., 278 A.2d 922, 925 (Pa. 1971). 
V. 
 The test for negotiability of drafts and checks is the 
same, and therefore, to this point there has been no need to 
discuss the differences between the two types of instruments.   
On remand, however, the distinctions may be important in 
resolving the issues remaining.  A brief discussion on the nature 
of drafts therefore may be helpful.   
 The parties have correctly designated the items in 
question as drafts, but at times have treated them as checks.  A 
check may be described in general terms as an order to a bank by 
a person having an account there to pay on demand a specified 
amount of money to a designated payee.  Although all checks are 
drafts, not all drafts are checks.  Drafts may take other forms 
as well.  For example, if the order to pay is directed to a third 
party other than a bank or to a bank where the drawer does not 
have an account, the item is a draft, but not a check.   
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 Drafts are sometimes used in sales transactions when 
the seller initiates the payment process rather than having the 
buyer issue a check.  In what is to some extent a reversal of 
roles, the seller, as drawer, writes a draft on the buyer as 
drawee.  Often the draft will provide that it is "payable 
through" a specified bank in which the buyer has an account.  
 That bank then pays the seller. 
 Drafts can also be used to implement a three-party 
transaction involving a buyer, seller and financing entity.  As 
an illustration, a buyer of an automobile signs a draft drawn on 
a finance company but payable to an automobile dealer through a 
specified bank.  The dealer deposits the draft in its own bank, 
which sends it to the finance company's bank.  After it approves 
the transaction, the finance company directs its bank to pay the 
draft to the automobile dealer.  Thereafter, the buyer makes 
periodic payments to the finance company.   
 In other instances, the arrangements between the buyer-
drawee and his bank may provide that the bank is to receive bills 
of lading or other documentation as a pre-condition to honoring 
the drafts.  These are called "documentary drafts." 
 Casualty insurance companies frequently use drafts for 
the payment of claims.  Adjusters sign the drafts payable through 
a named bank and deliver them to the claimant.  Copies of the 
draft and executed releases are sent to the home office, which 
can review those documents before authorizing its bank to pay the 
draft.  This procedure gives the home office some control over 
the payment of claims.  It also enables an insurance company to 
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place funds with the bank only when needed to honor drafts, 
rather than having the money remain idle in a checking account.  
 Another use of drafts is the withdrawal of funds from 
savings banks.  That practice is described in Pennsylvania 
Banker's Assoc. v. Secretary of Banking, 392 A.2d 1319 (Pa. 
1978).  For a general discussion of various types of drafts, see 
Barkley Clark & Barbara Clark, The Law of Bank Deposits, 
Collections and Credit Cards ¶¶ 1.05, 13.01 (Rev. ed. 1995); 
Brady on Bank Checks ¶ 1.13 (7th ed. 1992); Daniel E. Murray, 
Drafts "Payable Through" Banks, 77 Com. L.J. 389 (1972).  Steven 
B. Dow, Determining Bank Status in Article Four Check 
Collections, 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 43 (1987).   
 Universal uses drafts as a means of providing financing 
for policyholders to pay premiums due their insurance carriers. 
The arrangements are made through the insurance agents who sell 
the policies.  The customary procedure is for the insurance 
agent, acting on behalf of the policyholder, to sign the draft 
form supplied by Universal, fill in the amount desired and insert 
the name of the insurance company issuing the policy.  A copy of 
the draft, together with a Premium Finance Agreement executed by 
the policy holder, is sent to Universal.   
 The original draft is delivered directly to the 
insurance company, which deposits it in its bank.  The original 
draft is then transmitted to Universal's bank, Landmark.  On 
receipt, Landmark advises Universal, which is then required to 
instruct the bank within twenty-four or forty-eight hours whether 
to pay the draft.  In that interim, Universal calls the insurance 
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company to verify that a policy had been issued and that the 
financing transaction is apparently in good order. 
 With this understanding of the business practices 
followed in this case, we note briefly the various claims 
asserted by Universal.  Preliminarily, we point out that Talbot, 
as agent for the policyholder, was the drawer of the drafts. 
Universal was the drawee, not the "maker" as it was labeled by 
York employees.  Great American was the payee.  Landmark's status 
will be discussed infra.   
VI. 
 In addition to, or in the alternative to Article 3, 
Universal based its claims on Article 4 of the Commercial Code, 
governing bank deposits and collections.  Article 4's scope is 
not limited to negotiable instruments, but includes "items" that 
are defined as "any instrument for the payment of money even 
though it is not negotiable but does not include money."  13 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4104.  The drafts here come within that 
definition. 
 Universal relies on 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4207(a), 
which provides for warranties that are applicable upon payment or 
acceptance of an item.  That section provides in pertinent part 
that "[e]ach . . . collecting bank who obtains payment or 
acceptance of an item and each prior . . . collecting bank 
warrants to the payor bank or other payor who in good faith pays 
or accepts the item that:  (1) he has good title to the item or 
is authorized to obtain payment or acceptance on behalf of one 
who has a good title."  See Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
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Peoples Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Norristown, 274 A.2d 549 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1970) (per curiam) (Hoffman, J., concurring) 
(explaining operation of section 4207).    
 The liabilities for breach of warranty by banks in the 
collection process is affected by their status.  As we view the 
record before us, York Bank is the depository bank because it was 
"the first bank to which an item is transferred for collection." 
13 Pa. Cons.  Stat. Ann. § 4105.  It probably is also a 
collecting bank. 
 Landmark may be a collecting bank.  13 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. § 3120 provides that "[a]n instrument which states that it 
is `payable through' a bank or the like designates that bank as a 
collecting bank to make presentment but does not of itself 
authorize the bank to pay the instrument."  See also 13 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 4105 cmt. 3.  ("Items are sometimes drawn or 
accepted `payable through' a particular bank. . . .  [T]he 
`payable through' bank will be a collecting (and often a 
presenting) bank; it is not a `payor bank.'"   
 York, however, contends that Landmark was a payor bank, 
and as such had more responsibilities than a collecting bank.  It 
appears that determination of Landmark's status will be a 
significant factor in the resolution of Universal's claims under 
Article 4 and may require further development on remand.    
 Landmark's name, appearing as it does in the lower 
right-hand corner of the draft, creates an ambiguity.  Although 
that location usually identifies a party as the drawer or maker, 
see Mitchultka v. Grapin, 340 A.2d 576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975), it 
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is clear enough that Landmark was not intended to be such.  It 
may be that the uncertainty as to Landmark's status came about 
because the draft form was prepared by Universal and not the 
bank. 
 From our review of the record, including a scrutiny of 
the face of the items, we conclude that they are, to a 
substantial degree, akin to "payable through" drafts.  Although 
on their face the drafts do not contain the words "payable 
through," that lack is not determinative here for two reasons. 
First, the drafts are not negotiable and, thus, not within the 
term "instrument" as used in section 3120.3  Second, at this 
juncture, the evidence on the practice followed in issuing and 
paying the drafts corresponds to the "payable through" procedure. 
 The determination of whether a draft is of the "payable 
through" variety can be important in determining whether a bank 
that honors the item is a "payor" or a "collecting" bank. 
Although some courts have concluded that "payable through" status 
is determined by examining the face of the draft, they have 
nonetheless considered evidence on the function that the bank 
actually performed.  See Berman v. United States Nat'l Bank, 249 
N.W.2d 187 (Nebr. 1976); Engine Parts, Inc. v. Citizens Bank of 
Clovis, 582 P.2d 809 (N.M. 1978).  The net result is that 
extrinsic evidence has been used to determine whether a 
relationship similar to a "payable through" arrangement existed 
                     
3Article 3 is not always consistent in its use of the word 
"instrument".  See Mellinkoff, 77 Yale L.J. at 194-95.  It 
appears, however, that section 3120 uses the term to mean only 
negotiable items.  
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in fixing a bank's liability.  See Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. 
Bank of Washington, 120 S.E.2d 830 (N. C. 1961); Phelan v. 
University Nat'l Bank, 229 N.E.2d 374 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967); 
Wilhelm Foods, Inc. v. National Bank, 382 F. Supp. 605 (S.D.N.Y. 
1974) (distinguished by Horney v. Covington Cty. Bank, 716 F.2d 
335 (5th Cir. 1983)). 
 The argument against the use of extrinsic evidence 
rests on its possible adverse impact on negotiability.  Whatever 
may be the merits of restricting review to the face of the drafts 
to determine the status of the affected parties, that limitation 
has less weight here because the items are not negotiable.  See 
Dow, 49 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 63, 66-81.  Moreover, there is some 
significance to the fact that before a draft would be honored by 
Landmark, it had to be accepted by Universal.   
 On remand, therefore, in determining the status of the 
parties to the drafts under Article 4, the district court will 
not be restricted to the face of the items.  Instead, it will be 
free to consider whatever further evidence it deems necessary.   
VII. 
 In addition to its breach of warranty count, Universal 
insists that York is liable in conversion.  We note that this 
claim must be resolved on remand and observe that D & G Equipment 
Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Greencastle, 764 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 
1985), discussed a claim for conversion of checks.  We commented 
that under 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3419, an instrument is 
converted when it is paid on a forged indorsement.   
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 However, it appears that common law conversion in 
Pennsylvania may be somewhat broader in scope.  Id. at 957 n.4. 
In Cenna v. United States, 402 F.2d 168, 170 (3d Cir. 1968), we 
said that under Pennsylvania law, conversion is the "deprivation 
of another's right of property, or use or possession of a 
chattel, or other interference therewith, without the owner's 
consent and without legal justification."  
VIII. 
 Finally, Universal seeks a recovery based on 
negligence.  As York points out, when 13 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.  
§ 3405 applies, some courts have held that the drafters of Code 
intended to displace common law negligence actions.  See Law of 
Bank Deposits ¶ 8.04[8][c]; Brady on Bank Checks, § 31.17 
(collecting cases).   
 In the absence of a holding by an appellate court, we 
may assume, without deciding, that Pennsylvania would adopt that 
viewpoint.4  However, since we have concluded that section 3405 
does not apply here, Universal is free to establish, if it can,  
a case of negligence against York.   
 In that connection, York's action in depositing drafts 
made payable to one company in the account of another should be 
subject to scrutiny.  See, e.g., Commonwealth Fed. Savings & Loan 
v. First National Bank of New Jersey, 513 F. Supp. 296, 304 (E.D. 
                     
4In the 1990 revision, the fictitious payee provision formerly in 
§ 3405 was renumbered as § 3404 and provided for imposition of 
comparative negligence liability.  "In short, this is one area 
where the drafters of the 1990 UCC completely reversed a rule of 
the 1962 U.C.C."  Brady on Bank Checks ¶ 31.18 at 31-46. 
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Pa. 1979) ("established banking practice mandates that any check 
payable to a designated business entity can be accepted for 
deposit only into the account of such named payee").  Further 
development of this claim must await the remand.   
 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
reversed and the case will be remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this Opinion. 
